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Abstract
In this article we assess the electoral effects of the nomination of ethnic minority candidates. We argue that descriptive
representation is an important factor in how parties in SMD systems establish their coalitions over multiple elections. We
demonstrate this by showing that descriptive representation has a consistent effect on voting behavior, and thus that
parties can rely on descriptive representation to win over specific segments of the voting population. Previous studies
have been limited to single election years and single countries, but we collect original data from multiple election
cycles in Australia and the UK to test our argument. We find that descriptive representation is consistently associated
with a 10-percentage point bump in support from ethnic minority independents and Labour supporters. We conclude
by highlighting the importance of this finding for party competition.
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What electoral consequences is a party likely to face when
it nominates an ethnic minority candidate to stand for
higher office? Many scholars have argued that the electoral
effects of descriptive representation are both diverse and
politically important. Previous studies have shown that the
descriptive representation of minority groups leads to shifts
in vote choice, increased turnout (Barreto et al., 2004; Bobo
and Gilliam,1990; Gay, 2001; Jones, 2014; Mansbridge,
1999; Pantoja et al., 2001; Tate, 2003; Whitbey, 2007), and
even increased trust in political institutions among group
members (Scherer and Curry, 2010). There is a consider-
able amount of evidence that there is a tighter connection
between the electors and the elected when they both share
the same ethnic background (Pitkin, 1972). We argue that if
these effects are consistent, then nominating ethnic minor-
ity candidates can become an important tool political par-
ties use to gain votes, making descriptive representation
an important component of a party’s overall electoral strat-
egy. In this article we establish that the electoral effects of
descriptive representation are indeed consistent across a
variety of electoral contexts.
Many previous studies that examine the electoral conse-
quences of descriptive representation are limited to one
country or one election (Dancygier and Saunders, 2006).
This makes it difficult to separate short-term, election-
specific factors from the effects of descriptive representation,
and so hinders our ability to draw generalizable conclusions
about what the long-term effects of descriptive represen-
tation actually are. Using data from the UK and Australia,
spanning multiple elections, we introduce a new and com-
parative empirical assessment of the effects of descriptive
representation on voting behavior in an effort to establish the
necessary empirical baseline.1
This article is organized into four sections. In the first
section, we go over previous theoretical literature on
descriptive representation, highlighting in particular the
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potential trade-off between increasing ethnic minority par-
ticipation at the cost of a backlash from some ethnic major-
ity voters. We also emphasize the need for empirical
benchmarks for both phenomena. In the second section,
we introduce cross-country empirical evidence that
descriptive representation has a consistent effect. We show
that there is a 10-percentage point bump in support among
ethnic minority voters when center-left parties nominate an
ethnic minority candidate. In some instances we find that
the nomination of minority candidates produces a backlash
of similar magnitude from ethnic majority voters. We dis-
cuss the implications of our analysis for party competition
in the third section. The fourth section concludes and sug-
gests some avenues for future research.
1.1 The relationship between ethnicity and
voting behavior
Voters want to cast ballots for political parties that repre-
sent their interests. The classic Downsian model assumes
that representation takes place along a single left–right
dimension. Voters cast their ballot for the party closest to
the voter’s own position along this dimension (Adams
et al., 2005; Downs, 1957; Hinich and Munger,1997; Jes-
see, 2009; Merrill and Grofman, 1999). However, the vot-
ing behavior of many ethnic minority groups often
systematically violates this basic assumption of spatial the-
ories of voting. Members of ethnic and racial minority
groups repeatedly support social democratic parties in spite
of the fact that many group members hold conservative pol-
icy positions—ethnic minorities support social democratic
parties at a higher rate than their ideological self-placement
would suggest (Adams et al., 2005). In many cases, this
support is consistent over time, and these ethnic minority
groups become an important group in the party coalition.
This in turn can lead to changes in policy, in party systems,
and in election outcomes. This electoral loyalty is both
important and widespread.
For example,Dancygier andSaunders (2006; also seeSag-
gar, 2000) find that visibleminorities in theUKandGermany
vote disproportionately for Labour despite holding ideologi-
cal positions that are no different to those of the rest of the
population (when controlling for age, income, etc). Dawson
(1994) noted a similar connection between the Democratic
Party and African Americans in the United States—African
Americans support the Democratic Party at a higher rate than
what would be expected on the basis of left/right ideology
alone.Ethnicminority groups are frequently socially and eco-
nomically marginalized, so it is not surprising that most of
these groups support parties that favor the greater redistribu-
tion of wealth and the correction of social discrimination.
The same pattern of ethnic minority voting behavior has
been demonstrated in a number ofWestern countries (Dan-
cygier and Saunders, 2006—Britain and Germany;
Geddes, 2003; Saggar, 2000; Sobolewska, 2005—Britain;
Zingher and Thomas, 2012—Australia). However, many
ethnic and racial minority groups support social demo-
cratic parties at a higher rate than would be expected even
when taking into account the effects of economic margin-
alization. What explains the gap between ethnic minority
voters’ economic and social status and voting behavior?
Dawson (1994; also see Chong, 1991; Chong and Kim,
2006; Chong and Rogers, 2005; Dancygier and Saunders,
2006; Simon and Klandermans, 2001) first introduced the
term ‘‘linked fates’’ to explain the psychological micro-
foundations of African American bloc voting in the United
States. Dawson’s fundamental claim was that African
Americans in the United States viewed their social posi-
tion as inherently linked with that of other African
Americans. Middle class African Americans vote in
much the same fashion as poor African Americans—the
economic cleavage that crosscuts many other social
groups in the United States does not affect African
Americans in a comparable way.
If there is a gap between ethnic minorities’ ideological
positions and voting behavior it is the result of appeals to
voters along group lines. The importance of group member-
ship has the effect of introducing a second consideration
that shapes voting behavior along with an individual’s
ideological position. The introduction of this second con-
sideration has implications for party competition.Along
with offering the electorate a choice on the left–right eco-
nomic dimension, parties must also choose to try and
appeal to voters’ ethnic group attachments. The key ques-
tion here is: how do parties attempt to appeal to voters’
group attachments? Or in other words: how can a party
come to be viewed as representing a specific group’s inter-
ests, whatever they may be? We argue that one important
way that parties appeal to voters’ ethnic group attachments
is through the nomination of candidates from ethnic minor-
ity backgrounds. In the next subsection we explain the jus-
tification for this claim.
1.2 Descriptive representation as a tool for
increasing support in minority
communities
The nomination of descriptively representative candidates
is one relatively immediately malleable tool that political
parties have at their disposal that is capable of signaling a
credible commitment to group interests. Groups of all types
often view descriptive representation as a credible means
for incorporation of minority interests in politics. For mem-
bers of ethnic minority groups, sharing a common back-
ground and life experiences with their representative is
important for assuring quality representation (Bird et al.,
2010, Bloemraad, 2006; Preuhs, 2007). Higher levels of
voter turnout and lower levels of political alienation among
members of a minority group are found when minority
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groups are represented descriptively (Mansbridge 1999;
Pantoja et al., 2001; Whitbey, 2007). The potential mobiliz-
ing effects of descriptive representation have been shown
to be particularly strong amongst voters that might other-
wise not be engaged in the electoral process (Clark,
2014: 324–325). Descriptive representation can be an
attractive option for political parties that are looking to con-
solidate a base of electoral support, given descriptive repre-
sentation’s potentially dramatic influence on voters’
perceptions of party commitment to representing a group’s
interest. However, nominations are a scarce resource. If
descriptive representation is an effective electoral tool then
nominating minority candidates must gain the party more
votes than it costs them. The key question here is: what
are the electoral effects of nominating an ethnic minority
candidate?
Prior studies have provided evidence that suggests that
the nomination of ethnic minority candidates is associated
with an increase in ethnic minority turnout and support
for the co-ethnic candidate. In an analysis of the 2010
British general election, Fisher et al. (2014: 18) found
that those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi heritage were
more likely to support co-ethnic candidates, while those
of West Indian and African heritage were not. However,
other studies that examine the electoral effects of nomi-
nating ethnic minority candidates have produced different
results depending on the election year and the party doing
the nominating (Curtice et al., 2005; Mortimore, 2002;
Stegmaier et al., 2013). It is likely that different parties
generate different levels of increased ethnic minority sup-
port from the nomination of ethnic minority candidates—
some parties might stand to gain more than others. Parties
on the left generally have a head start in attracting the
support of minority groups due to the left’s long-
standing association with economically marginalized
groups. Heath et al. (2013: Table 5.3) found that the vast
majority of ethnic minorities in Britain perceived the
Labour Party as better representing the interests of ethnic
minorities. Similar sentiments have been observed in the
Australian case as well (Zingher and Thomas, 2012: 382).
It is possible that a greater degree of policy congruence
makes descriptive representation a more effective elec-
toral tool for parties on the left than parties on the
right—which are capable of offering descriptive represen-
tation but lack the reputation for representing the interests
of the economically and socially marginalized (Budge
and Farlie, 1983; Griffin and Keane, 2006).
Gaining the votes of visible minorities is undoubtedly
desirable, but political parties wishing to tap into the
potential electoral power of immigrant communities often
pay significant costs in the form of the loss of other groups
of voters (Bird et al., 2010; Dancygier, 2010: 183–194).
Some voters view visible minorities with unease or enmity
(Wood et al., 2009), as they are thought to be sources of
competition over jobs and social welfare resources (Ford,
2011; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). Fisher et al. (2014)
demonstrated that while the nomination of minority candi-
dates can spur co-ethnic voting, whites were less likely to
support minority candidates—especially Muslims.
Because natives’ attitudes towards immigrants are often
unfavorable, incorporating immigrants into a political
party carries a significant electoral risk, especially when
placing ethnic minorities in highly visible positions on the
ballot. Anti-immigrant parties have been successful in
many mature democracies and could conceivably make
considerable electoral gains if the major parties engage
in descriptive representation (Arzheimer and Carter,
2006; Ezrow, 2010; Franzmann, 2011; Golder, 2003; Hug,
2001; Meguid, 2010; Mudde, 2007; Norris, 2005).
It is this dynamic that contributes to the important long-
term effect that descriptive representation has on party
competition. Dancygier articulates this process in her anal-
ysis of the decisions that Labour and the Conservatives
must make when deciding how aggressively to court the
ethnic minority vote, particularly through nominating
minority candidates. Labour targeted South Asian immi-
grant voters and eventually positioned South Asian candi-
dates on the Labour Party ballot. The result of this was
an initial loss of white voters but a subsequent domination
of several electoral districts on the strength of South Asian
turnout (Dancygier, 2010: 202–207; Saggar, 2000). The
story told by Dancygier parallels the story of immigrant
political participation in New Deal era United States where
the Democratic and Republican parties were making the
same calculations when deciding how to approach recent
Southern and Eastern European immigrants (Andersen,
1979; Wolfinger, 1965). Managing this trade-off is very
important for the leaders of political parties, who must
decide whether they have more to gain from nominating
ethnic minority candidates, or are likely to lose in the long
run due to an ethnic majority backlash. Because this elec-
toral calculus is likely of considerable consequence, we
seek to establish exactly what the underlying parameters
of this tradeoff actually are.
Most existing studies are limited by the fact that they
examine only one election in one country. It is difficult
to disentangle the general relationship between ethnic
minority candidacy and voting behavior from other short-
term electoral forces. This problem is made worse because
there have been a limited number of ethnic minority candi-
dates in British and Australian elections, meaning there
might be significant year-to-year variance that arises as the
product of small sample size. As a result, different studies
have produced different results, depending on the specific
electoral context. It is our goal to construct an analysis
that spans both multiple elections and multiple countries
in order to establish whether ethnic minority candidacy
has a consistent effect on both ethnic minority and white
voting behavior. We develop this basic set of expectations
into a set of testable hypotheses in the next subsection.
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1.3 Empirical implications
The real question here is: what is the effect of descriptive
representation on individual-level voting behavior? The
existing literature on the nomination of ethnic minority
candidates suggests that descriptive representation might
have a twofold effect on voting behavior. Firstly, there is
evidence that suggests that the nomination of ethnic minor-
ity candidates is likely associated with an increase in sup-
port among ethnic minority voters within the district.
This expectation leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: The nomination of ethnic minority candidates is
associated with an increase in electoral support from
ethnic minority voters within the district. This incr-
ease in support can come both from an increase in
turnout and from attracting voters who might other-
wise support rival parties.
From a party’s perspective, the nomination of ethnic
minority candidates might be a desirable electoral strategy
if descriptive representation produces a significant bump
in electoral support from minority voters. However, this
is assuming there are no electoral costs associated with
placing ethnic minority candidates on the ballot. There
is considerable evidence in the literature that the nomina-
tion of ethnic minority candidates is associated with a
drop in support among non-minorities. This leads to a sec-
ond hypothesis:
H2: The nomination of ethnic minority candidates is
associated with a decrease in electoral support from
non-ethnic minority candidates within the district.
This decrease in support can come from both a
decrease in turnout and from losing voters to other
rival parties.
In the section below, we present a comprehensive assess-
ment of the evidence so far. We estimate the effect of
descriptive representation in multiple years and multiple
countries, in order to establish whether descriptive represen-
tation can indeed have the important role that we hypothe-
size in assembling and maintaining party coalitions.
2.1 Research design, data, model
specification, and results
Our main hypothesis is that, all else equal, ethnic minority
voters are more likely to vote for an ethnic minority candi-
date than for a non-ethnic minority candidate. If a consis-
tent effect emerges, across multiple elections, this
suggests that descriptive representation plays an important
role in how parties cultivate long-term support. We test this
hypothesis in this section using electoral and candidate data
from the UK and Australia in an effort to conduct a compre-
hensive analysis of how descriptive representation affects
voting behavior in the context of single member district
elections. The comprehensiveness of the analysis is not just
reflected in our sample size, but also in the range of sub-
samples we examine: we estimate the effect of descriptive
representation on partisans and independents, on vote
choice and turnout, on white voters and ethnic minority
voters, and when two or more parties both run ethnic
minority candidates.2
We use a combination of individual level survey data
and candidate level data in order to test our hypotheses. Our
individual level data comes from multiple iterations of two
major public opinion surveys: the British Election Study
(BES) and the Australian National Election Survey
(ANES). Our data from the UK spans 1983 through 2010
while our data from Australia spans 2004 through 2010.
The span of our data was limited in the Australian case due
to the limited availability of data regarding the candidates’
ethnic backgrounds. We utilized a variety of sources to
code each candidate’s ethnic background. In the British
case, we rely on a variety of secondary sources noting all
ethnic minority candidates at each election (Anwar, 1984;
Butler and Kavanagh, 1997; Le Lohe´, 1993; Linton,
1987; Norris, 2010). In Australia we utilized candidate pro-
files from the House of Representatives website to code
candidate ethnicity, as well as news reports and archived
personal websites, and we focused on immigrant back-
ground. A supplementary appendix3 is available online
detailing the full coding scheme and identifying the source
for each ethnic minority candidate.
2.2 The dependent variable—vote choice
Our dependent variable is self-reported voting behavior,
with 0 being ‘‘did not vote’’ and the other categories repre-
senting votes cast for the different available party choices.
The slate of party offerings is fairly similar in both coun-
tries. The Australian Labor Party and the British Labour
Party represent the center-left in each country. Likewise,
the Conservative Party represents the center-right in the
UK, as does the Liberal-National coalition in Australia.
However, there are some slight differences between the
party offerings in the two countries. The primary differ-
ence is that the Liberal Democrats, a centrist party, is a
prominent third party offering in the UK, while the Aus-
tralian Green Party has become increasingly prominent
in Australian politics. The Australian Greens have won
seats in both houses of the Australian legislature in recent
elections. Table 1 displays the dependent variable coding
in each country.4
The institutional structure is largely the same in the two
countries. Both countries employ single member districts in
lower house elections, however the ballot structure is
slightly different; Australia employs the alternative vote
(AV), where voters list their party preference orderings
from first to last, while the UK employs the single
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non-transferable vote (Cox, 1997). In Australia, the depen-
dent variable was coded as each voter’s first preference on
the alternative ballot. Another difference between the two
countries is that Australia employs the compulsory vote.
Over 90 percent of eligible voters actually cast a ballot as
a result, thus the number of voters in the ANES survey that
did not cast a ballot is trivial and we omit the ‘‘did not
vote’’ category from the Australian analysis.
2.3 Independent variables
Our key independent variables are respondent ethnicity and
candidate ethnicity. Although we provide more detail on
specific coding decisions in the supplementary online
appendix, we use self-reported racial identity from the BES
and self-reported immigration history as the closest equiv-
alent from the AES. For candidates, we use the dichoto-
mous coding scheme of Norris (2010), i.e. ethnic
minority (1) or non-ethnic minority (0), in Britain and again
take immigration status, i.e. immigrant (1) or non-
immigrant (0), for the Australian counterpart. The Austra-
lian coding scheme allows us to cast our net as broadly as
possible, including all political candidates who have an
immigrant background that they could potentially empha-
size during a campaign in order to influence immigrant vot-
ers.5 Although this coding scheme necessarily captures
many different immigrant groups who have different spe-
cific representation dynamics (Zingher and Thomas,
2012), this again only increases the probability of a Type
II error. We also include a variable in the online appendix
for Australia that more closely matched the Norris (2010)
scheme for Britain so that, as more data become available,
future research can assess this more comprehensively.
What is important to keep in mind with this coding
scheme is that it provides for a very tough test of our argu-
ment. Theoretically, there is no reason why a South Asian
voter would be more likely to support a West Indian candi-
date, even though they are both coded as ethnic minorities
in our analysis. We are comfortable tolerating this potential
mismatch between concept and operationalization—our
coding scheme introduces a potential source of Type II
error into our analysis, making our hypothesized relation-
ship more difficult to corroborate.
We present descriptive statistics for the variables high-
lighted above in Table 2. We can see that Britain has com-
paratively few ethnic minority respondents, and an even
smaller minority who live in districts where even one party
offers descriptive representation. For example, Labour ran
138 ethnic minority candidates in 99 unique districts over
the seven elections in Britain, with the Conservatives run-
ning 132 candidates in 105 unique districts. In Australia the
numbers are 45 candidates in 25 districts over three elec-
tions for Labor, and 48 candidates in 26 districts for the
Liberal-National coalition over the same election-
s.6Although much work needs to be done to understand
why these districts in particular attract such candidates, and
to understand the extent to which parties take into account
the identities of rival candidates in a given district, the first
step in understanding the electoral effects of descriptive
representation is to examine the relationship of candidates
to voters. This makes it doubly important to conduct a com-
prehensive analysis. It is also worth noting that the numbers
of ethnic minority major party candidates (Labour and the
Conservatives in Britain, Labour and the Liberal-Nationals
in Australia) are low, which comports with other accounts
(Saggar, 2000) and helps reinforce the validity of the
coding in each country.
In addition to variables for respondent and candidate
ethnicity we also include an interaction term between these
two variables. It is the interaction between candidate ethni-
city and respondent ethnicity that interests us primarily. We
are interested in how ethnic minority voters will respond to
ethnic minority candidates. This interaction term will allow
us to test this conditional effect. The interaction will be
equal to one if and only if both the respondent and the can-
didate are from ethnic minority backgrounds—otherwise
the value for the interaction term will be zero. Because
multiple parties are capable of running ethnic minority
Table 1. Dependent variable by country.
Dependent
variable Britain Australia
0 Did not vote (base
category)
Did not vote (excluded:
too few observations)
1 Voted Conservative Voted Lib-Nat (base
category)
2 Voted Labour Voted Labor
3 Voted Lib Dem Voted Green
4 Voted Other (excluded:
too few observations)
Voted Other (excluded:
too few observations)
Table 2. Descriptive statistics: Sample frequency of respondents.
Britain Australia
No Yes No Yes
Ethnic Minority (EM) 17,993 763 3587 1179
Major Left Party Descriptive
Representation (DR Left)
18,192 564 4305 461
Major Right Party Descriptive
Representation (DR Right)
18,329 427 4218 548
Interaction: DR Left * EM 18,706 50 4624 142
Interaction: DR Right * EM 18,685 71 4628 138
Election years 1983, 1987,
1992, 1997,
2001, 2005,
2010
2004, 2007,
2010
Total observations 18,756 4766
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candidates in the same district and because the effect of
nominating an ethnic minority candidate might vary from
party to party, we include one interaction term for each
major party.
We include a standard set of demographic and attitudi-
nal control variables on the individual level. We control for
party identification, religion, gender, and age. In addition to
these individual level controls, we are also able to include
macro-level control variables to account for the vote per-
centages of the various parties over time. It is possible that
there is a different baseline probability of supporting a par-
ticular party in each district. Moreover, it is also possible
that differences in this underlying probability are correlated
with the size of the minority population in the district and
the ethnicity of the candidates (Sobolweska, 2013: 616).
Controlling for the parties’ previous share of the vote helps
to account for the effect of non-random differences in the
level of competitiveness between districts. In order to fur-
ther account for within-country variation we use year fixed
effects that account for election-to-election shifts in aggre-
gate level party support.
We present descriptive statistics for the variables high-
lighted above in Table 2. We can see that Britain has com-
paratively few ethnic minority respondents, and an even
smaller minority who live in districts where even one party
offers descriptive representation. This again highlights the
need for an analysis of multiple surveys.
2.4 Statistical models
All of the elections in our dataset feature multiple parties,
making multinomial logit an attractive specification for our
analysis.7 Since we are running a multinomial logit on a
nominal dependent variable, different coefficients are esti-
mated for J – 1 categories of the dependent variable, and
are displayed below next to the appropriate category. The
base category in the UK is not voting, whereas in Australia
we use vote for the Liberal-National coalition as the base
category. Standard errors are clustered by year.8
PrðYi ¼ jVoteChoiceÞ ¼ e
 0jXi
P4
k¼0
e
0
j
Xi
ð1Þ
2.5 Results
We now present the results of two multinomial logit equa-
tions predicting voting behavior among respondents in
Britain and Australia. The number of categories of the
dependent variable, together with a large number of catego-
rical independent variables, means that Table 3 contains a
large number of coefficients. We display them for transpar-
ency, but move away from this unwieldy format when it
comes to interpreting the results. We are particularly inter-
ested in whether the interaction terms described above have
positive coefficients with respect to the associated party’s
vote-choice outcome. The coefficients below suggest that
this is the case, as the coefficient for the Labour Party in
Britain is statistically significant and in the expected direc-
tion, and the coefficient for the Labor Party in Australia is
in the expected direction.
In order to properly explore these effects we now move
to interpreting these non-linear interactive coefficients. We
follow Brambor et al.’s (2006) method of interpreting the
effect of an interaction term by calculating the marginal
effects. Table 3 simulates the estimated effect of ‘‘adding’’
descriptive representation, in a number of different scenar-
ios (all other variables are set to their respective means or
modes). For three sets of partisan voters, we show the pre-
dicted probability of not voting, or of casting a ballot for
Labour, the Conservatives, or the Liberal Democrats
respectively. The following tables contain a comparison
of the likelihood that a voter will choose any of the four
options without descriptive representation and then with
descriptive representation. 90% confidence intervals are
included below each predicted probability.
Interpreting the British results first, we begin with the
Labour Party and find a statistically and substantively sig-
nificant effect: approximately a 10-percentage point bump
in support among ethnic minority Labour partisans which is
statistically significant at the 90% level. That is, the prob-
ability that an ethnic minority Labour partisan will support
Labour is 0.80 when a white candidate is on the ballot,
opposed to 0.89 percent when an ethnic minority candidate
is running in the district. The increase in Labour support is
of similar magnitude among ethnic minority independents
(from 0.24 to 0.39), but the effect just misses hitting tradi-
tional levels of statistical significance.9 Interestingly, there
is a statistically significant decrease in the likelihood that
these ethnic minority independents will vote for the Liberal
Democratic candidate when Labour runs an ethnic minority
candidate in the same district. This suggests that the nomi-
nation of ethnic minority candidates can help Labour con-
solidate support among ethnic minority voters that might
otherwise support the Liberal Democrats. This finding in
Table 4 thus lays the empirical micro-foundations for argu-
ments about party competition.
With Labour expecting a statistically significant 10
point bump, we next examine the Conservative Party.
However, an interesting wrinkle in these findings is that
there is never a statistically significant effect on ethnic
minority vote choice when the Conservatives nominate
an ethnic minority candidate (this is true for both ethnic
minorities and whites). The results for Conservatives are
shown in Table 5.
This suggests that the effect of descriptive representa-
tion might not be independent of party brands. Since we
do not have the statistical power to examine Liberal Dem-
ocrats too, we cannot discern the reason for this lack of
effect based on the results of this analysis; however, it is
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certainly possibly that the effect of descriptive representa-
tion is conditional upon the level of policy congruence
between the group and the party offering descriptive repre-
sentation. Thus, although a reliable 10-percentage point
effect is found for some parties, this does not hold for all
parties. This finding suggests the need for further research
on how descriptive representation interacts with policy
congruence.
Having examined the effect of Labour and Conservative
nomination strategies on ethnic minority respondents, we
now use this same specification to examine the effect that
nomination of ethnic minority candidates has on white Brit-
ons’ voting behavior. When Labour nominates ethnic
minority candidates there is an associated decline in sup-
port among white Labour partisans. Table 6 demonstrates
the existence of a backlash effect; white Labour partisans
respond to ethnic minority candidates with a 10-
percentage point decline in support. We estimate that the
likelihood that a white Labour partisan will actually vote
for the Labour Party declines from 77 percent to 67 percent
when Labour nominates an ethnic minority candidate. This
decline in Labour support among whites is associated with
a statistically significant increase in white support for the
Liberal Democrats. There is almost no effect on white
independents or white Conservative partisans, although the
probability of voting Labour declines very slightly (but not
statistically significantly) in both cases. We find similar
results for the Conservatives in Table 7. The changes for
this party are statistically insignificant, unlike the results
for Labour partisans, but they suggest the same 10 point
drop in partisan support, as white Conservative partisans’
probability of voting Conservative drops from almost 0.7
to around 0.6 if the Conservatives run an ethnic minority
candidate.
We find a similar pattern of results in Australia, bolster-
ing our findings from the UK. As we show in Table 8,
Labor receives just under a 10-percentage point increase
in the likelihood that ethnic minority respondents will sup-
port when they run an ethnic minority candidate. This
effect is statistically significant at the 90% level. We esti-
mate that the Labor Party also receives a sizeable 17-
percentage point bump among ethnic minority indepen-
dents. This increase in support of Labor comes at the
expense of a decrease in support for the Green Party. This
finding is similar to the British case, where the increase in
support for Labour came largely at the expense of the Lib-
eral Democrats.10 Another similarity to the British case is
that no statistically significant effects for the center-right
Table 3A. British multinomial logit analysis regressing vote choice on candidate ethnicity (base category ¼did not vote.Year fixed
effects included but not shown).
Variables Conservative Labor Other
Party ID: Left –1.76*** (0.42) 1.12*** (0.36) –0.31 (0.34)
Party ID: Right 1.76*** (0.36) –1.86*** (0.34) –0.52 (0.33)
Party ID: Other –0.37 (0.46) –0.88*** (0.32) 1.98*** (0.44)
Party ID: None –0.49** (0.25) –1.22*** (0.21) –0.30 (0.27)
Religion: Protestant ––––– ––––– –––––
Religion: Catholic –0.59*** (0.11) –0.02 (0.11) –0.32*** (0.07)
Religion: Jewish –0.33 (0.52) 0.15 (0.39) –0.32 (0.51)
Religion: Muslim –0.72*** (0.23) 0.16 (0.11) 0.07 (0.40)
Religion: Buddhist –0.99* (0.57) –0.59 (0.40) –0.71 (0.65)
Religion: Sikh 0.35 (0.47) –0.03 (0.22) 0.00 (0.86)
Religion: Hindu –0.64 (0.73) 0.16 (0.42) –0.36 (0.45)
Religion: Atheist –0.78*** (0.09) –0.45*** (0.08) –0.37*** (0.02)
Religion: Other –0.47*** (0.13) –0.38*** (0.14) –0.11 (0.10)
Ethnic Minority –0.77*** (0.22) –0.21 (0.13) –0.83*** (0.27)
Female –0.03 (0.06) 0.05 (0.07) –0.01 (0.05)
Age ––––– ––––– –––––
Incumbent: Left –0.10 (0.10) 0.11* (0.06) –0.10 (0.11)
Incumbent: Right –0.28** (0.11) –0.10 (0.09) –0.07** (0.03)
Vote %: Right 0.03*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01 (0.00)
Vote %: Left 0.01 (0.01) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.01)
Vote %: Other 0.01** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.04*** (0.00)
DR: Left 0.16 (0.19) –0.37*** (0.12) 0.21 (0.15)
DR: Right –0.35** (0.14) –0.01 (0.22) 0.23 (0.29)
Int: DR Left *EM –0.38 (0.63) 0.85*** (0.13) –1.37*** (0.42)
Int: DR Right * EM –0.57 (0.91) –0.24 (0.36) 0.26 (0.23)
Constant –1.31*** (0.50) –0.51** (0.25) –1.40*** (0.47)
N ¼ 18756
Standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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(Lib-Nat) party are found, as shown in Table 9. This rein-
forces the impression that descriptive representation not
only has a consistent effect, but that it is also consistently
conditional on the party brand.
One important difference between the British and Austra-
lian cases is that there is also much less evidence of white
backlash against minority candidates in Australia. As Tables
10 and 11 demonstrate, the nomination of ethnic minority
candidates does not produce any discernable effect on white
voting behavior. The same is true when the Lib-Nats nomi-
nate an ethnic minority candidate. The nomination of ethnic
minority candidates by the Liberal-National coalition fails
to produce a statistically significant effect on either white or
ethnicminority voting behavior.Onepossible explanation for
this couldbecompulsoryvoting,whichmeans that theportion
of the psychological backlash that is translated into abstention
in Britain is not translated the same way in Australia.
All of the control variables are in the expected direction
in both analyses. Unsurprisingly, voters that identify as a
member of a party are significantly more likely to actually
vote for the party. Voters that do not identify with a party
are more likely to abstain from voting in the British case.
3.1 Discussion
The preceding analysis has raised several conceptual issues
that merit further discussion. We have found strong and
consistent evidence that center-left parties can expect
around a 10-percentage point bump in ethnic minority par-
tisan support if they nominate an ethnic minority candidate.
This is statistically significant in both Britain and Australia.
However, one question that analysis raises is: what are the
long-term implications of the nomination of ethnic minor-
ity candidates? Are they different for different parties?
Ethnic and racial minorities often support a particular party
at rates higher than socioeconomic variables alone can
explain. The gap between a group’s socioeconomic status
and voting behavior is often attributed to ‘‘linked fates’’
or other explanations focused on the effects of collective
identity. But how do groups of voters come to see one party
as systematically representing the interests of the group?
The nomination of ethnic minority candidates might be part
of this explanation. Our analysis demonstrates that ethnic
minority voters behave differently when an ethnic minority
candidate is on the ballot. Over time it is possible that a
party’s repeated nomination of ethnic minority candidates
could work to forge a link between the group and the party
that goes beyond what common policy interests alone can
explain. This could also help explain why the effects are
greater for center-left parties than center-right parties. It
is also worth noting that this basic process could help to
explain the attachment between several other types of niche
groups (environmentalists, or religious minorities such as
Jews) and a particular political party. We believe that the
preceding analysis comprehensively demonstrates the use-
fulness of pursuing this avenue of research.
The fact that the nomination of ethnic minority candi-
dates significantly alters the likelihood that ethnic minorities
and whites will support a particular party implies that the
decision to nominate an ethnic minority candidate in a given
district is not always an easy one. Most theories that attempt
to explain party behavior are rooted in the assumption that
parties are motivated, at the very least in part, by the desire
to maximize the party’s share of the vote. Therefore, there is
likely an element of strategy guiding each party’s decision
about when and where to nominate minority candidates. Our
analysis established that when center-left parties nominated
minority candidates there was a boost in support among
minority voters and in some instances there was a backlash
by white voters within the district. This finding implies that
we should observe parties only nominating minority candi-
dates in districts where the electoral benefits outweigh the
potential risks—or in other words, districts with sizeable
minority partisan or minority independent populations.
However, we must add some important caveats about
out study before moving forward. The conclusions that
we are able to draw about the relationship between ethni-
city and voting behavior are limited because we were
Table 3B. Australian multinomial logit analysis regressing vote
choice on candidate ethnicity (base category ¼Voted Liberal.Year
fixed effects included but not shown).
Variables Labor Other
Party ID: Left 2.55*** (0.17) –1.39*** (0.48)
Party ID: Right –3.69*** (0.27) –5.66*** (0.65)
Party ID: Other –––––
Party ID: None –0.33** (0.17) –2.87*** (0.48)
Religion: Protestant 0.06 (0.39) –0.11 (0.19)
Religion: Catholic 0.20 (0.20) 0.17 (0.25)
Religion: Jewish 1.32** (0.64) 0.01 (1.09)
Religion: Muslim 2.14*** (0.62) 3.21*** (0.68)
Religion: Buddhist 0.67*** (0.16) 0.76 (1.33)
Religion: Sikh ––––– –––––
Religion: Hindu 0.24 (0.90) 0.19 (0.83)
Religion: Atheist 0.55 (0.46) 0.94** (0.16)
Religion: Other ––––– –––––
Ethnic Minority 0.16*** (0.06) 0.29 (0.24)
Female 0.40** (0.17) 0.22*** (0.002)
Age –0.0004 (0.001) –0.01 (0.01)
Incumbent: Left –0.37** (0.18) –0.39 (0.13)
Incumbent: Right –0.07 (0.46) 0.15 (0.50)
Vote %: Left 0.02 (0.01) –0.02 (0.01)
Vote %: Right –0.003 (0.02) –0.03 (0.01)
Vote %: Other ––––– –––––
DR: Left 0.44 (0.56) 0.80** (0.37)
DR: Right 0.31 (0.19) 0.11 (0.07)
Int: DR Left *EM 0.12 (0.80) –1.66*** (0.26)
Int: DR Right * EM –0.34 (0.44) –0.64*** (0.24)
Year: 2007 0.41*** (0.07) 2.37 (0.16)
Year: 2010 –0.01 (0.05) 2.25 (0.10)
Constant –0.71 (0.58) 1.53 (0.78)
N ¼ 4766
Standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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forced to dichotomize ethnicity into a minority/non-
minority category as opposed to looking at each ethnic
group individually. The reason why this is important is that
it is not clear why a South Asian voter might be more likely
to support a West Indian candidate (or vice versa). Our
results show a general ‘‘representation effect,’’ as ethnic
minority candidates tend to perform better amongst ethnic
minority voters, but we are unable to tell whether this is the
result of increased inter- or intra-group support. Future
studies, with larger numbers of ethnic minority voters, will
be necessary for disentangling the differences (if any)
in how ethnic minority voters respond to ethnic minority
candidates from their own group versus candidates from
other minority groups. This will be particularly valuable
in Australia, where the coding scheme unifies a somewhat
wider variety of descriptive representation processes under
the heading of ‘‘immigrant background’’, with relatively
high profile candidates being foreign-born. The online
Table 4. Predicted probabilities that British Ethnic Minority respondents will support Labour candidates.
Britain: Ethnic Minority respondents and Labour candidates
Voters
Conservative partisans Independents Labour partisans
Candidate White candidate EM candidate White candidate EM candidate White candidate EM candidate
PR: Not vote 0.16
(0.11–0.21)
0.19
(0.04–0.34)
0.39
(0.37–0.41)
0.40
(0.28–0.51)
0.13
(0.10–0.15)
0.09
(0.06–0.12)
PR: Vote Con 0.73
(0.66–0.79)
0.69
(0.45–0.93)
0.19
(0.16–0.21)
0.15
(0.02–0.29)
0.02
(0.01–0.02)
0.01
(0.00–0.02)
PR: Vote Lab 0.05
(0.03–0.07)
0.10
(0.01–0.19)
0.24
(0.19–0.29)
0.39
(0.26–0.52)
0.80
(0.76–0.84)
0.89
(0.86–0.93)
PR: Vote LD 0.06
(0.04–0.08)
0.02
(0.01–0.03)
0.18
(0.12–0.24)
0.06
(0.03–0.09)
0.06
(0.03–0.08)
0.01
(0.01–0.02)
Table 5. Predicted probabilities that British Ethnic Minority respondents will support Conservative candidates.
Britain: Ethnic Minority respondents and Conservative candidates
Voters
Conservative partisans Independents Labour partisans
Candidate White candidate EM candidate White candidate EM candidate White candidate EM candidate
PR: Not vote 0.40
(0.15–0.65)
0.54
(0.41–0.67)
0.72
(0.55–0.88)
0.72
(0.62–0.82)
0.41
(0.22–0.60)
0.45
(0.25–0.64)
PR: Vote Con 0.53
(0.29–0.77)
0.33
(0.12–0.55)
0.10
(0.03–0.17)
0.05
(0.00–0.09)
0.02
(0.00–0.03)
0.01
(0.00–0.02)
PR: Vote Lab 0.03
(0.02–0.04)
0.03
(0.00–0.05)
0.09
(0.07–0.11)
0.07
(0.03–0.11)
0.52
(0.37–0.68)
0.45
(0.27–0.62)
PR: Vote LD 0.04
(0.02–0.07)
0.10
(0.00–0.20)
0.09
(0.02–0.17)
0.16
(0.05–0.27)
0.05
(0.01–0.10)
0.10
(0.03–0.16)
Table 6. Predicted probabilities that white British respondents will support Labour candidates.
Britain: White respondents and Labour candidates
Conservative partisans Independents Labour partisans
White candidate EM candidate White candidate EM candidate White candidate EM candidate
PR: Not vote 0.08
(0.06–0.11)
0.07
(0.05–0.09)
0.26
(0.21–0.31)
0.25
(0.22–0.28)
0.10
(0.09–0.11)
0.12
(0.11–0.14)
PR: Vote Con 0.81
(0.78–0.84)
0.83
(0.79–0.87)
0.27
(0.23–0.31)
0.30
(0.25–0.35)
0.03
(0.02–0.04)
0.04
(0.02–0.06)
PR: Vote Lab 0.03
(0.02–0.04)
0.01
(0.01–0.03)
0.20
(0.16–0.23)
0.13
(0.07–0.19)
0.77
(0.74–0.80)
0.67
(0.60–0.75)
PR: Vote LD 0.07
(0.06–0.08)
0.08
(0.06–0.09)
0.27
(0.23–0.31)
0.32
(0.22–0.28)
0.10
(0.09–0.11)
0.16
(0.11–0.21)
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Table 7. Predicted probabilities that white British respondents will support Conservative candidates.
Britain: White respondents and Conservative candidates
Conservative partisans Independents Labour partisans
White candidate EM candidate White candidate EM candidate White candidate EM candidate
PR: Not vote 0.24
(0.11–0.37)
0.29
(0.16–0.42)
0.57
(0.43–0.72)
0.57
(0.47–0.67)
0.34
(0.20–0.48)
0.34
(0.24–0.44)
PR: Vote Con 0.68
(0.54–0.81)
0.60
(0.45–0.75)
0.17
(0.10–0.24)
0.12
(0.06–0.18)
0.03
(0.01–0.04)
0.02
(0.01–0.03)
PR: Vote Lab 0.02
(0.01–0.03)
0.02
(0.01–0.04)
0.09
(0.08–0.10)
0.09
(0.07–0.10)
0.53
(0.42–0.64)
0.52
(0.42–0.62)
PR: Vote LD 0.06
(0.05–0.07)
0.09
(0.07–0.11)
0.17
(0.11–0.24)
0.21
(0.16–0.27)
0.10
(0.06–0.14)
0.12
(0.09–0.15)
Table 8. Predicted probabilities that Australian immigrant respondents will support Labor candidates.
Australia: Ethnic Minority respondents and Labor candidates
Lib–Nat partisans Independents Labor partisans
White candidate EM candidate White candidate EM candidate White candidate EM candidate
PR: Vote Lib–Nat 0.94
(0.90–0.98)
0.92
(0.90–0.95)
0.39
(0.26–0.53)
0.31
(0.26–0.35)
0.04
(0.02–0.06)
0.03
(0.02–0.03)
PR: Vote Lab 0.04
(0.02–0.06)
0.07
(0.06–0.08)
0.47
(0.38–0.57)
0.65
(0.63–0.67)
0.90
(0.86–0.93)
0.96
(0.94–0.98)
PR: Vote Green 0.02
(0.00–0.04)
0.01
(0.00–0.02)
0.13
(0.06–0.20)
0.04
(0.00–0.10)
0.06
(0.01–0.11)
0.02
(0.00–0.04)
Table 9. Predicted probabilities that Australian immigrant respondents will support Conservative candidates.
Australia: Ethnic Minority respondents and Lib–Nat candidates
Lib–Nat partisans Independents Labor partisans
White candidate EM candidate White candidate EM candidate White candidate EM candidate
PR: Vote Lib–Nat 0.96
(0.95–0.97)
0.96
(0.94–0.99)
0.48
(0.45–0.51)
0.50
(0.37–0.64)
0.06
(0.05–0.06)
0.06
(0.03–0.09)
PR: Vote Lab 0.03
(0.02–0.04)
0.03
(0.01–0.05)
0.43
(0.40–0.45)
0.44
(0.31–0.56)
0.89
(0.88–0.91)
0.91
(0.87–0.95)
PR: Vote Green 0.01
(0.01–0.02)
0.01
(0.00–0.01)
0.10
(0.07–0.12)
0.06
(0.05–0.07)
0.05
(0.03–0.06)
0.03
(0.01–0.05)
Table 10. Predicted probabilities that native Australian respondents will support Labor candidates.
Australia: White respondents and Labor candidates
Lib–Nat partisans Independents Labor partisans
White candidate EM candidate White candidate EM candidate White candidate EM candidate
PR: Vote Lib–Nat 0.95
(0.93–0.97)
0.92
(0.82 –1.00)
0.44
(0.33–0.54)
0.31
(0.05–0.58)
0.05
(0.03–0.07)
0.03
(0.00–0.07)
PR: Vote Lab 0.03
(0.02–0.05)
0.05
(0.00–0.11)
0.45
(0.36–0.55)
0.51
(0.24–0.77)
0.90
(0.89–0.91)
0.89
(0.84–0.94)
PR: Vote Green 0.01
(0.00–0.03)
0.03
(0.00–0.07)
0.11
(0.08–0.14)
0.18
(0.10–0.26)
0.05
(0.03–0.08)
0.08
(0.04–0.12)
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appendix helps narrow down these candidates into aborigi-
nal candidates, foreign-born in non-EU and non-English
speaking country candidates, and other foreign-born candi-
dates, so as to allow future research to address these ques-
tions when more survey data are available.11
Another limitation of our current analysis is that it is
focused on two cases with similar histories and electoral
institutions; we do not explore how institutional differences
might affect the relationship between ethnic minority
groups, political parties, and descriptive representation.
The electoral effect of descriptive representation might be
quite different in more proportional electoral systems with
larger district magnitudes where party lists are important
and there are clearer avenues for small parties to gain rep-
resentation. One potential avenue for future study could be
to analyze the effect that these institutional differences
have on the nomination of ethnic minority candidates and
to assess whether the electoral effects of nominating minor-
ity candidates differ according to the institutional context.
4.1 Conclusions
Previous research has demonstrated that there is a consider-
able gap between ethnic minorities’ policy preferences and
voting behavior. We have argued that descriptive represen-
tation explains why this gap remains—at least in part. Col-
lecting data from the UK and Australia, we demonstrate
that descriptive representation is consistently associated
with around a 10 point bump. This effect was statistically
significant for ethnic minority Labour partisans in Britain,
and just missed statistical significance for ethnic minority
independents in Britain. Our findings in Australia largely
mirror our findings in the UK, only we found that the nomi-
nation of ethnic minority candidates had an even stronger,
and statistically significant, effect on the behavior of ethnic
minority independents. Together these results begin to
paint an overarching picture of the electoral consequence
of descriptive representation. This is an important finding
for a number of reasons. First, we show that descriptive rep-
resentation is a common phenomenon with relatively con-
stant effects, even in vastly different countries and years.
That this can indeed be established empirically illustrates
that descriptive representation can be a consistent tool that
parties use to win votes. The very consistency of this effect
suggests that it can be a powerful tool for winning the long-
term loyalty of voters.
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Notes
1. We examine SMD systems because they are more likely to
have smaller party systems and so have more instances of par-
ties attempting to represent multiple ethnic groups, making
the potential tradeoff regarding what group to court very clear
(Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994). We choose Australia and
the UK because they both have SMD electoral systems with
relatively centralized candidate selection procedures. Other
SMD systems, such as the USA and Canada, have similarly
electorally important ethnic minorities but have candidate
selection systems that are more open (Norris 1997, Norris and
Levenduski 1997). In addition, there are also severe data
problems with both the USA and Canada, as historical infor-
mation on candidate ethnicity is missing in many cases.
2. In the absence of an experimental design, we argue that this is
the best possible estimate of the effect of descriptive repre-
sentation. There are only a small number of districts that
receive descriptive representation and they are often the dis-
tricts with the highest concentration of ethnic minority voters.
Multiple parties in a country sometimes hone in on such dis-
tricts, all offering descriptive representation at once. This
suggests that many processes are going on at once, and our
control variables are unlikely to capture them all. However,
an experimental design is not a far-fetched idea in this con-
text. In Britain, new ethnic minority candidates are already
assigned haphazardly to one of many impossible-to-win
Table 11. Predicted probabilities that native Australian respondents will support Conservative candidates.
Australia: White respondents and Lib–Nat candidates
Lib–Nat partisans Independents Labor partisans
White candidate EM candidate White candidate EM candidate White candidate EM candidate
PR: Vote Lib–Nat 0.97
(0.95–0.98)
0.96
(0.94–0.97)
0.52
(0.48–0.57)
0.45
(0.41–0.50)
0.07
(0.06–0.07)
0.05
(0.04–0.06)
PR: Vote Lab 0.03
(0.02–0.03)
0.03
(0.02–0.05)
0.40
(0.36–0.43)
0.47
(0.38–0.56)
0.90
(0.87–0.91)
0.91
(0.89–0.94)
PR: Vote Green 0.01
(0.00–0.01)
0.01
(0.01–0.01)
0.08
(0.04–0.12)
0.08
(0.03–0.12)
0.04
(0.03–0.05)
0.04
(0.04–0.06)
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seats. In practical terms, it would not be difficult to randomize
this process, nor would it be too likely to affect actual demo-
cratic outcomes.
3. Available here: https://sites.google.com/a/binghamton.edu/
benfarrer/data.
4. In addition, there are a number of other small parties in both
countries. Votes cast for all of these smaller parties are grouped
into the ‘‘other’’ parties category due to the small number of
responses. Even with this pooling, we were forced to omit the
‘‘other’’ category fromboth theUKandAustralian analyses due
to the small number of votes cast for these small parties.
5. The most comprehensive question on ethnic minority status
that is asked consistently in the AES is a question about
immigrant heritage, but follow-up questions on particular
national backgrounds have lower response rates, and so the
best available fit capture descriptive representation was
between foreign-born respondents and foreign-born candi-
dates. These differences in operationalization are important,
and so we run the models separately and interpret the results
separately. Similarly, although ideally we would have coded
candidate ethnicity in a more nuanced way than simply
‘‘white’’ or ‘‘ethnic minority’’, information beyond this level
was often unavailable and the number of observations was too
low in any other categories of candidate ethnicity. We obtain
almost identical results if immigrants from the UK, Ireland,
and New Zealand are excluded.
6. There was a considerably larger number of ethnic minority
candidates that ran for office in the 2010 British election. This
raises the question of: to what extent is 2010 driving the over-
all results of the analysis? We assess this question by replicat-
ing the analysis on the 2010 subsample and the 1983–2005
subsample. The results of these analyses reveal substantively
similar results to the fully pooled analysis, although we find a
much weakened effect in 2010.
7. There has been a debate about whether multinomial logit is an
appropriate model for capturing vote choice in multiparty elec-
tions. This debate is centered on the fact that the multinomial
logit specification assumes that the different choices are inde-
pendent and irrelevant alternatives. One alternative is themulti-
nomial probitmodel,which does not require the IIA assumption
(Alvarez and Nagler, 1998; Glasgow, 2001).We did not use the
MNP because it requires information about the parties’ posi-
tions in policy space in order to assess the substitutability of the
choices. By having to make assumptions about where parties
fall in policy space, we would be forced to eliminate ‘‘did not
vote’’ and the catchall ‘‘other parties’’ categories.
8. A multilevel model would allow us to better measure differ-
ences between districts, but for computational reasons we rely
on a multinomial logit model and attempt to control for
district-level variation as much as possible by using the con-
trol variables described above.
9. These findings emerge whether or not the Conservatives are
running an ethnic minority candidate in the district.
10. Once again, these findings also emerge if we generate the
same predicted probabilities but assume that the Lib-Nat
candidate also has an ethnic minority background (but also,
once again these findings are less statistically significant).
We also find the same results if we run these regressions only
using ethnic minority/immigrant respondents.
11. In supplementary analyses using these variables we find sim-
ilar but weaker results due to the much smaller number of
respondents.
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